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THE WAR POWERS AND THE POLITICAL 
QUESTION DOCTRINE
E dwin B. F irmage*
A fundamental and potentially healthy tension exists between 
democratic government, under which the majority ordinarily pre­
vails, and judicial review, by which the judiciary may check uncon­
stitutional actions of the political branches. A balance must be struck 
between the two concepts, or one could consume the other. Unchecked 
majoritarianism could erode not only constitutional protections of 
individual and minority rights, but also federalism and the constitu­
tional separation of powers. Judicial review without limit would 
result in the degradation of democratic government and a correspon­
ding rule by judges.
Devices built into the American system of government prevent 
unbridled majoritarianism. Most significant among the inherent 
controls are the impact of federalism upon the national government1 
and republican rather than direct democratic rule or government by 
plebiscite. Moreover, an elaborate system of checks and balances 
flowing from a separation of powers is designed not only to prevent 
autocracy by a few but tyranny of the majority as well.2 Other 
methods of avoiding unbridled majoritarianism include bicameralism 
as part of the constitutional compromise; the responsibility of each of 
the political branches to raise within its own house the issue of the 
constitutionality of its own acts; sensitivity within the political 
branches toward acts which could impinge upon the domain of a 
sister branch; popular resistance to acts by the political branches 
which could undermine the independence of the judiciary; and our 
long accepted tradition of the doctrine of judicial review.
• 0 Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law. Appreciation is ex­
pressed to John E. B. Myers and Thomas B. McAffee, my research assistants, for 
their help in the preparation of this article, which will appear in abbreviated 
form as a chapter in Wormuth, F irmage & Butler, The War Powers (1978).
1. W echsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism—The Role of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, in Princi­
ples, Politics, and Fundamental Law 49-82 (1961).
2. Although the system of checks and balances was purchased at the cost 
of efficiency, that very cost seems to promote the ultimate goal of the system. 
In Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926), Justice Brandeis stated in 
his dissent:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Conven­
tion of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise 
of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by 
means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the 
governmental powers among three departments, to save the people 
from autocracy.
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Unchecked judicial review is avoided in part by constraints 
imposed by the judicial branch itself. These constraints include a 
number of constitutional and extraconstitutional judicial doctrines, 
including the ‘ case and controversy” limitation upon judicial review, 
standing, ripeness, justiciability, abstention, the rejection of economic 
substantive due process, and the political question doctrine.
The political question doctrine is that principle under which the 
courts defer the determination of an issue to the political branches 
of government. The relationship between this doctrine and the war 
powers presents a most sensitive problem because core values are at 
issue and are to some extent in opposition to each other. Foreign 
policy generally, and the war powers in particular, can involve 
questions of national survival, and these questions are constitutionally 
committed primarily to the political branches. For obvious reasons, 
the courts have not been expected to play as large a role in these areas 
as they have in the protection of individual rights. Yet the manner of 
the exercise of the war powers determines not only the nations 
freedom from external danger, but also the respect which the national 
government has for law and for constitutional limitations on the 
exercise of power. The courts have played a particularly vital function 
in requiring lawful behavior from government.
The political question doctrine has produced spirited disagree­
ment over its objective, its legitimating source, and its confines. The 
importance and seriousness of the debate arise primarily from one fact. 
Under the political question doctrine, a court may refuse to render 
an independent ruling on an issue arising under the Constitution in 
a case in which all normal prerequisites, constitutional and non-con­
stitutional, to an independent juridical determination have been met. 
Jurisdictional requisites and the “case and controversy” requirements 
of standing and adversariness are present and the issues are suffi­
ciently “concrete.” The case is properly “ripe” and yet not overripe 
or moot. The famous dictum of Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens 
v. Virginia that the Court “will not take jurisdiction if it should not; 
but . . . must take jurisdiction, if it should,” 3 would seem finally to 
apply. Nevertheless, under the political question doctrine the court 
may fashion a rule of decision based conclusively upon a prior deter­
mination of the issue by a political branch, or it may ..refuse to decide 
the merits of the case because the resolution of the issue has been 
constitutionally committed to a branch which has not yet spoken
3. 19 U.S. (6  Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). Marshalls dictum continues: 
With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be at­
tended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no 
more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, 
than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would 
be treason to the Constitution.
Id. See text accompanying notes 40-49 infra.
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definitively. Additionally, the court may conclude that the political 
branch whose acts have been challenged as illegitimate is the judge 
of its own acts within a broad range of discretion granted it by the 
Constitution, and thus the court determines in double negative that 
the branch has not acted unconstitutionally. This issue of the politi­
cal question doctrine is distinguished from typical adjudication in 
that the court does not affirmatively legitimate the challenged act as 
consistent with the guidelines provided by the constitutional text, but 
affirms only that the branch in question possesses authority to decide 
the merits of that question itself.
The political question doctrine has often been linked with the 
conduct of foreign policy, sometimes by sweeping dicta to the effect 
that the entire area of foreign policy is covered by the doctrine.4 
A more accurate view,6 however, is that the criteria most often asso­
ciated with the doctrine—constitutional commitment to the political 
branches, the need for fact-finding by the political branch, a lack of 
judicially manageable standards, and prudential considerations— are 
often, but not always, present in the resolution of issues in the conduct 
of foreign policy.
Several conclusions are drawn in the material that follows. First, 
the Constitution granted to the political branches primary but not 
exclusive direction of foreign affairs in general and the use of the war 
powers in particular. Second, the Constitution placed Congress in 
a dominant position in determining broad policy in foreign relations 
and granted Congress the sole power to initiate hostilities, with the 
exception of allowing presidential response to foreign initiated hostili­
ties against the United States. Third, an obvious erosion of congres­
sional power and a consequent aggrandizement of executive power has 
occurred in the conduct of foreign policy and the use of the war 
powers during this century. Fourth, the federal courts have acted
4. E.g., in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918 ), the 
Court stated:
The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed 
by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative— “the political”—  
Departments of the Government, and the property of what may be 
done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial in­
quiry or decision.
See also, C. W. W right, Law o f Federal Courts 46 (2d. ed. 1970). Justice 
Jackson addressed the Court’s limited role in foreign relations in Chicago & S. 
Air Lines Inc. v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1 9 4 8 ):
Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution on the 
political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative. 
They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. 
They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible 
to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are de­
cisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities, 
nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the 
domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.
5. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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as a check upon the misuse of the war powers by political branches, 
but more often have avoided such a role by invoking the political 
question doctrine. Fifth, the courts are, however, in an incomparably 
stronger position to perform independent constitutional review of one 
political branch’s act under the war powers if the other political 
branch is in open and formal disagreement with that act. The Supreme 
Court in particular is then in a position to perform its historic and 
increasingly accepted role as the final arbiter of the constitutional 
jurisdictional lines separating the delegated functions of the three 
branches of government. When Congress openly challenges an 
executive act under the war powers and the courts proceed inde­
pendently to review the merits of the case, the powerful textual 
constitutional base for congressional predominance should place the 
Congress in an exceedingly strong position. Finally, Congress has 
removed much of the force of the political question doctrine as an 
impediment to independent judicial review of executive war power 
acts by adopting the War Powers Resolution.6
Theoretical Nature of the Doctrine
The Case Law Development.
English development of the political question doctrine began as 
early as the fifteenth century with the case of The Duke of York’s 
Claim to the Crown? The Duke of York sought to establish through 
the courts his right to the throne. In declining to adjudicate such a 
momentous issue, the judges declared that they “durst not enter into 
any communication thereof, for it perteyned to the Lordes of the 
King’s blode" In 1793 The Nabob of the Carnatic v. East India Com­
pany 8 further elucidated the developing political question doctrine. 
The case contained elements of sovereign immunity intertwined with 
the political question issue. When the Nabob sued the Company 
for breach of contract, the court held that the Company, in contracting 
with the Nabob, was acting as agent of the sovereign. Such a case, 
involving the foreign relations of the sovereign, was considered to be 
beyond the competence of the courts.
The political question doctrine was brought to America as part 
of the common law. In Marbury v. Madison9 and again in United 
States v. Palmer10 Chief Justice Marshall used the term “political” to
6. 50 U.S.C. $$ 1541-48 (1973).
7. 5 Rotuli Par. 375 (1460). An analysis of the history of the political 
question doctrine may be found in Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 Harv. 
L. Rev. 338 (1924). See also, C. Post, The Supreme Court and P o litica l 
Questions (1969).
8. 1 Ves. Jr. 370 (1791 ), 2 Ves. Jr. 56 (1793).
9. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
10. 16 U.S. (3  Wheat.) 610 (1818).
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mean “discretionary.” He noted that the Court would not “intrude 
into the cabinet” or “intermeddle with the prerogatives of the 
executive.” 11 In delimiting the Court’s proper boundaries, he stated 
in Marbury:
The province of the court is, solely, to decide the rights of indi­
viduals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, 
perforin duties in which they have a discretion. Questions, in 
their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, 
submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.12
Marshall observed the degree to which the Constitution committed 
great discretionary latitude to the political branches in matters of 
foreign policy. In Palmer he noted that “such questions are generally 
political rather than legal in their character. They belong more 
properly to those who can declare what the law shall be; who can 
place the nation in such a position with respect to foreign powers as 
to their own judgment shall appear wise. . . 18 Marbury and 
Palmer thus illustrate that when a discretionary function of the Pre­
sident or Congress is sought to be adjudicated, the Court will, in 
most cases, refuse independent review because the nature of the 
issue is political and not juridical.14
An early case concerning the President's power over foreign 
affairs further reveals the underpinnings of the political question 
doctrine. In Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Company15 the Company 
attempted to prove that Argentina exercised sovereign authority over 
certain islands even though the President had declared otherwise. 
The Court held that the executive’s decision was conclusive upon the 
judiciary because the executive branch was charged by the Constitu­
tion with the conduct of foreign relations. The Presidents assumption 
of a fact in regard to sovereignty could not be questioned by the 
Courts.
[I]t is not material to inquire, nor is it the province of the court 
to determine, whether the executive be right or wrong. It is 
enough to know, that in the exercise of his constitutional func­
11. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170.
12. Id.
13. 16 U.S. (3  Wheat.) at 633-34.
14. Similarly, in Decatur v. Pauling, 39 U.S. (14  Pet.) 496 (1 8 4 0 ), the 
Court addressed the question of executive discretion. The case involved an 
attempt through mandamus to force the Secretary of the Navy to pay a pension. 
Chief Justice Taney stated:
The interference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary 
duties of the executive departments of the government, would be pro­
ductive of nothing but mischief; and we are quite satisfied that such a 
power was never intended to be given to them.
Id. at 516.
15. 38 U.S. (13  Pet.) 415 (1839).
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tions, he had decided the question. Having done this under the 
responsibilities which belong to him, it is obligatory on the people 
and government of the Union.16
The reluctance of the judiciary to review the determination of a 
foreign affairs issue by a political department was also manifested 
in Foster v. Neilson,17 Congress had determined that certain lands in 
the Mississippi River region were under the authority of the United 
States. Chief Justice Marshall held that the decision of the political 
branches bound the Court. He stated:
A question like this, respecting the boundaries of nations, is, as 
has been truly said, more a political than a legal question, and in 
its discussion, the courts of every country must respect the pro­
nounced will of the legislature.18
Luther v. Borden19 decided in 1849, is certainly the most cele­
brated of the early cases establishing the American doctrine of politi­
cal question.20 The Luther case arose out of Dorr s Rebellion in Rhode 
Island 21 when defendants entered Luther s dwelling in an attempt to 
arrest him. Luther brought an action of trespass quare clausum fregit 
against the defendants.22 In defense it was asserted that entry was 
made pursuant to orders issued by the lawful government for the 
purpose of arresting Luther, who was suspected of aiding and abetting 
the insurrection. The plaintiff countered that the entry was illegal 
because the insurrectionary government represented the only "repub­
lican” government in Rhode Island, as guaranteed by the Constitu­
tion.23 The case thus turned upon a determination of which of the 
two rival groups was entitled to recognition as the lawful govern­
ment. The court declined to decide the question, holding that it was 
political in nature.24 Since Luther, the Court generally has refused
16. Id. at 420.
17. 27 U.S. (2  Pet.) 253 (1829).
18. Id. at 308.
19. 48 U.S. (7  How.) 1 (1849).
20. Contrary to popular belief, however, Luther was not the first Supreme 
Court case to discuss the doctrine. In Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3  Dali.) 199 
(1796), the Court declined to decide whether a treaty had been broken. In 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), Justice Marshall stated that 
questions in their nature political were for the political and not the judicial branch. 
In 1793 the Court declined to offer President Washington advice on matters of 
foreign policy. See 1 C. W arren, The Supreme Court in United States 
History 110-11 (1922).
21. See generally 48 U.S. (7  How.) at 34-38; G ettlem an, The Dorr 
Rebellion (1973 ); W. Wiecek, The Guarantee Clause o f th e  U. S. Constitu­
tion (1972).
22. 48 U.S. (7  How.) 1, 2 (1849).
23. R. I. C o n s t , art. Ill, § 4.
24. Justice Brennan, in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 223 (1962 ), stated that 
Luther held “that the Guaranty Clause is not a repository of judicially manageable 
standards which a court could utilize independently in order to identify a State's 
lawful government.” In Luther, Chief Justice Taney discussed the power of the
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to overturn state25 or congressional26 action solely on the basis of 
the guaranty clause.27
Although the development of the political question doctrine in 
American constitutional jurisprudence has not by any means been 
smooth or uniform, it now occupies a firm place in our law. The 
doctrine is associated with numerous types of cases, notably cases 
dealing with the foreign relations of the nation.28 More specifically, 
the determination of the length of military occupation,29 the bound­
aries of a nation,30 and the legitimate sovereign of a region,31 are all 
political questions. Similarly, decisions relating to whether a party 
is a diplomatic agent to the United States,32 whether a nation is 
entitled to status as a belligerent,33 and certain decisions relating to 
treaties34 also fall within the purview of the political question
President under Article III, section 4 to come to the aid of an imperiled state 
government:
It is said that this power in the President is dangerous to liberty, and 
may be abused. All power may be abused if placed in unwortlw 
hands. But it would be difficult, we think, to point out any other hands 
in which this power would be more safe, and at the same time 
equally effectual. When citizens of the same State are in arms 
against each other, and the constituted authorities unable to execute 
the laws, the interposition of the United States must be prompt, or 
it is of little value. The ordinary course of proceedings in courts of 
justice would be utterly unfit for the crisis. And the elevated office 
of the President, chosen as he is by the people of the United States, and 
the high responsibility he could not fail to feel when acting in a case of 
so much moment, appear to furnish as strong safeguards against a willful 
abuse of power as human prudence and foresight could well provide.
48 U.S. (7 How.) at 44,
25. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917); Pacific States 
Tel. & T. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1911); Taylor & Marshall v. Beckham 
(No. 1), 178 U.S. 548 (1900).
26. Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867).
27. But in Carr an equal protection argument prevailed over dissenting posi­
tions that the Court's action merely presented a guaranty clause political question 
in the dress of equal protection. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 241-50 (1961) 
(Douglas, J., concurring). See also, Bonfield, Baker v. Carr: New Light on the 
Constitutional Guarantee of Republican Government, 50 Cal. L. Rev. 245 (1962); 
Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional 
Desuetude, 46 Minn. L, Rev. 513 (1962).
28. See, e.g., Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
29. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
30. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2  Pet.) 253 (1829).
31. Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 414 (1839).
32. In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403 (1890).
33. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818).
34. Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (1853). See Charlton v. Kelly, 
229 U.S. 447 (1913); Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902).
[W]here a treaty confers private rights, such as are enforceable in a 
municipal court, on the citizens or subjects of the nations party to it, 
the courts look upon the treaty as a rule of decision and place their 
own interpretation upon it.
But, where public rights are involved in a treaty, the courts accept 
the interpretation of the political departments.
C. Post, supra note 7, at 81-82 (1969).
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doctrine. Other factual and legal situations which sometimes trigger 
the doctrine are those in which the beginning and ending dates of 
hostilities are at issue; 35 questions concerning the degree of proof 
required to determine whether a statute has been properly enacted; 86 
the status of Indian tribes;37 some aspects of deportation of aliens;38 
and the efficacy of ratification by state legislatures of proposed federal 
constitutional amendments.39
Theoretical Formulations
The fundamental constitutional concept of separation of powers, 
which keeps the various branches balanced and in check, lies at the 
base of the political question doctrine.40 This constitutional basis 
exists whether one believes, as does Herbert Wechsler, that the doctrine 
is properly invoked only in circumstances where the Constitution has 
delegated the resolution of the issue at hand to the political branches,41
35. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2  Black) 635 (1862); Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 
U.S. 238 (1 8 8 9 ); Brown v. Hiatts, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 177 (1 8 7 2 ); United 
States v. Anderson, 76 U.S. (9  Wall.) 56 (1 8 6 9 ); Commercial Trust Co. v. 
Miller, 262 U.S. 51 (1 9 2 3 ); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1 9 4 8 ); Ross v. 
Jones, 89 U.S. (22  Wall.) 576 (1874); The Protector, 79 U.S. (12  Wall.) 700 
(1 8 7 1 ); Adger v. Alston, 82 U.S. (15  Wall.) 555 (1872); Raymond v. Thomas, 
91 U.S. (1 Otto) 712 (1875). But see Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 
U.S. 146 (1 9 1 9 ); Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924).
36. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
37. United States v. Old Settlers, 148 U.S. 427 (1893 ); Fellows v. Blacksmith, 
60 U.S. (19  How.) 366 (1856).
38. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
39. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939).
40. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962 ); Levi, Some Aspects of 
Separation of Powers, 76 C o lu m . L. R ev. 371, 386 (1976).
41. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Hahv. 
L. Rev. 1 (1959). Professor Wechsler's landmark article was written partially 
in response to Judge Learned Hand’s Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures of 1958. 
Judge Hand argued that judicial review should be justified practically and 
shall not be inferred from the structure of the Constitution. This theory 
led him to the conclusion that the use of the judicial power was a matter of 
discretion rather than duty. Thus, for Judge Hand, the political question doctrine, 
with its largely undefined parameters, was an affirmation of his discretionary 
theory of judicial review. See L. Hand, The B i l l  o f Rights 15-16 (1958). 
Professor Wechsler disagreed with Judge Hand’s conception of judicial review 
and political question. He argued that the doctrine of judicial review is anchored 
in the Constitution and is based on the duty of courts to decide the law in an 
appropriate case and controversy. For him, to grant discretion in the use of the 
political question doctrine is to compromise the validity of judicial review itself. 
He thus argues for a classical theory of the political question doctrine:
I submit that . . . the only proper judgment that may lead to an 
abstention from decision is that the Constitution has committed the de­
termination of the issue to another agency of government than the 
courts. Difficult as it may be to make that judgement wisely, what­
ever factors may be rightly weighed in situations where the answer is 
not clear, what is involved is in itself an act of constitutional inter­
pretation, to be made and judged by standards that should govern the in­
terpretation process generally. That, I submit is toto caelo different 
from a broad discretion to abstain or intervene.
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or whether more discretionary and pragmatic considerations of ex­
pediency,42 prudential judgment,43 and various functional strengths 
and weaknesses of the separate branches44 point toward the resolution
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Revv
1, 9 (1959).
42. See C. Post, supra note 7. The basic premise of Profesor Post’s book is 
that the use of the political question doctrine is a product of consideration of 
expediency. The political climate and facts behind a case do not go unnoticed 
by the Court. The author contends, for example, that the Luther Court placed 
the issue in that case in the category of “political questions” in order to explain 
the conclusion it had already reached; the concept of separation of powers 
merely provided “the legal bases for these practical considerations.” Id. at 107.
See also P. Strum, The Supreme Court and “P o litica l Questions” : A 
Study in Judicial Evasion (1974). The primary hypothesis of Professor Strum’s 
book is that the Court utilizes the doctrine in cases where there is a substantial 
possibility that a judgment, if rendered, would not be enforced. In Finkelstein, 
Judicial Self-Limitation., 37 Harv. L. Rev. 338, 344-45 (1923), the author 
concludes:
What are these political questions? To what matters does the term 
apply? It applies to all those matters of which the court, at a given 
time, will be of the opinion that it is impolitic or inexpedient to take 
jurisdiction. Sometimes this idea of inexpediency will result from the 
fear of the vastness of the consequences that a decision on the merits 
might entail. Sometimes it will result from the feeling that the court 
is incompetent to deal with the particular type of question involved. 
Sometimes it will be induced by the feeling that the matter is “too 
high” for the courts. But always there will be a weighing of con­
siderations in the scale of political wisdom.
See also Finkelstein, Further Notes on Judicial Self-Limitation, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 
221 (1925).
43. See A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962). Professor Bickel 
rejects in part Wechsler’s “classical” approach to the political question doctrine 
but also asserts that the doctrine is based on a considered judgment rather 
than sheer expediency or arbitrary discretion. Id. at 197. Professor Scharpf has 
correctly characterized Bickel’s approach as a “normative” theory of political 
question because it is based on the view that extra-legal considerations—economic, 
political, military, international—ought to be allowed to guide the decisions of 
the political branches in given areas as much as constitutional principles. Scharpf, 
Judicial Review and the Political Question—A Functional Analysis, 75 Yale L. J. 
517, 558-66 (1966). Bickel’s view that the Court should occasionally abstain 
from reaching the merits, rather than use techniques of broad interpretation to 
uphold questionable acts by the political branches, is based on his belief that 
the Court exists primarily to uphold principle. Even if the Court determines 
that various considerations should prevent judicial intervention against acts of 
the political branches, the Court should not uphold such acts if it cannot do so 
in a principled way. Instead, Bickel would have the courts refrain from making 
an independent determination while praising the principles that the branches 
should consider. Professor Scharpf objects that this approach might provide 
grounds for expanded use of the doctrine and would ultimately undermine the 
effectiveness of the court, in both its function as arbiter of the Constitution and 
“teacher to the citizenry.” Id. at 561-66.
44. In Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1939), Chief Justice Hughes 
wrote that the judiciary could not decide whether a proposed amendment to the 
federal Constitution had ceased to be viable through lapse of time. He stated:
Where are to be found the criteria for such a judicial determination? 
None are to be found in Constitution or statute. . . . [T]he question 
of a reasonable time in many cases would involve, as in this case it 
does involve, an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, 
political, social and economic, which can hardly be said to be within
H e in O n l in e  - -  49 U. C o lo .  L. Rev. 73 1977-1978
7 4 U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  C O L O R A D O  L A W  R E V I E W  [ V o l .  4 9
of a particular issue by a particular branch. Commentators and 
some courts have noted that in certain situations the political 
question doctrine is particularly likely to be invoked. For example, 
courts are prone to defer judgment in cases where there is an absence 
of judicial standards or rules governing the resolution of the particular 
dispute; 46 an absence of sufficient information available through the 
limited judicial fact-finding techniques;40 a fear of non-enforcement 
of an unpopular decision and consequent injury to the credibility of 
the judicial system;47 an issue before the courts which, while 
justiciable, is part of a larger issue that is not justiciable; 48 or an issue 
which is simply so awesome in its consequences that ultimate resolu­
tion, to be legitimate, must necessarily rest with a political branch.49
the appropriate range of evidence receivable in a court of justice and 
as to which it would be an extravagant extension of judicial authority 
to assert judicial notice as the basis of deciding a controversy with 
respect to the validity of an amendment actually ratified.
The judiciary by its nature is not well suited for certain kinds of determina­
tions demanding particular resources for fact-finding and policy determination, 
as are the political branches with their popular mandates and their supporting 
bureaucracies. Professor Scharpf has argued accordingly for a functional theory 
of the political question doctrine. Scharpf, supra note 43. Professor Scharpfs 
functional theory attempts to forge a middle ground between the classical and 
the discretionary theories. Although Scharpf maintains that political question 
cannot be explained in terms of “textual commitment” alone, he attempts to 
limit the scope of the doctrine by suggesting some guidelines designed to mini­
mize the discretion used in its application. He notes that “much, if not all, of 
the Court's political question practice should, like the procedural and jurisdictional 
techniques of avoidance, be explained in functional terms, as the Court's acknowl­
edgment of the limitations of the American judicial process.” Id. at 566.
45. Scholars disagree on the weight to be accorded the problem of finding 
applicable rules as a factor in the judicial decision to invoke the political ques­
tion doctrine. Compare Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Fed­
eral Courts, 8 Minn. L. Rev. 485, 511-12 (1924), with Scharpf, supra note
43, at 555-56.
46. See Frank, Political Questions, in Supreme Court and Supreme Law
34, 38 (1968); Scharpf, supra note 43, at 566-67. In Commercial Trust Co. v. 
Miller, 262 U.S. 51 (1923), the Court stated with regard to the ending of war 
that “the power which declared the necessity is the power to declare its cessa­
tion, and what the cessation requires. The power is legislative. A court cannot 
estimate the effects of a great war and pronounce their termination at a particular 
moment of time. . . .” Id. at 57.
47. Proponents of the prudential theory emphasize the Court's fear of non­
enforcement as a major factor in the political question doctrine. In Duncan v. 
Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946), Justice Burton, in dissent, dealt with this 
issue. In his opinion the Court had improperly intruded into the sphere of the 
war powers reserved to the political branches and thus invited disregard of the 
judgment by the other branches. Id. at 343 (Burton, J., dissenting). See 
generally P. Strum, supra note 42; Finkelstein, supra note 42. For an argument 
that the enforcement problem is overrated as a factor triggering use of the 
political question doctrine, see Scharpf, supra note 43, at 552-53.
48. See, e.g., Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 
333 U.S. 103 (1948).
49. A. Bickel, supra note 43, at 184. Professor Bickel concluded his formula­
tion of the doctrine by stating:
Such is the foundation, in both intellect and instinot, of the political 
question doctrine: the Court’s sense of lack of capacity, compounded
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The doctrine may be considered not only as a term of art, but 
also as a descriptive phrase with some intrinsic meaning. Some issues 
may be inherently so “political” that they demand resolution by a 
popular body to insure legitimacy of decision. The term "political” 
in this context is employed in the same generic way as it was by 
Hamilton in his now famous description of the impeachment process:
[Impeachment is appropriate for] those offenses which proceed  
from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from 
the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature 
which may with peculiar propriety be denominated PO LIT IC A L, 
as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society 
itself.50
The question of judicial review of a Senate conviction in presidential 
impeachment would seem to present such an inherently “political” 
issue.51 It can be argued that the Constitution commits to the 
Senate the final decision to remove a President, but the nature and 
purposes of the impeachment processes contend even more strongly 
against judicial review of the Senate's action. The impeachment 
process was intended to be therapeutic— a cleansing process, in which 
the Congress sits as a court of the nation, to reestablish and reaffirm 
executive legitimacy, or to symbolize its irrretrievable loss. The 
prospect of review of such a decision by an appointed judiciary 
would severely undermine the purgative effects of the process. 
The impeachment proceedings are effective only if the accusers of 
the executive present their case to the people52 and to the Senate 
at roughly the same time.53 Only in this way can the impeachment 
process accomplish not only its purgative and prophylactic functions, 
but its healing and restorative functions as well. Judicial review of 
this process would rend the connection between the political branch 
and the people which is essential for the reestablishment of executive 
legitimacy.
in unequal parts of (a) the strangeness of the issue and its intrac­
tability to principled resolution; (b) the sheer momentousness of it, 
which tends to unbalance judicial judgment; (c ) the anxiety, not so much 
that the judicial judgment will be ignored, as that perhaps it should 
but will not be; (d) finally ("in a mature democracy” ), the inner 
vulnerability, the self-doubt of an institution which is electorally irre­
sponsible and has no earth to draw strength from.
50. The Federalist No. 65, at 423-24 (Modern Library College ed. 1937) 
(A. Hamilton) (emphasis in original).
51. Firmage & Mangrum, Removal of the President: Resignation and the 
Procedural Law of Impeachment, 1974 Duke L. J. 1023.
52. The legitimacy of a democratic government must be established in the 
minds of the people; it follows that the legitimacy of a new administration could 
only be assured by public recognition that the previous mandate had clearly 
expired. This is made possible through appropriate rules to allow media coverage 
of the proceedings.
53. See Firmage & Mangrum, supra note 51, at 1044-45.
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A similar example of an inherently political issue inappropriate 
for judicial action is presented in Coleman v. Miller.6* Members of the 
Kansas Senate who opposed ratification of the child labor amendment 
to the Federal Constitution alleged that “the amendment had lost its 
validity through lapse of time.” 55 The Supreme Court affirmed the 
state court’s denial of relief. The Court initially took note of the lack 
of judicial criteria by which to establish “reasonable time.” More 
importantly, however, the Court described the issue as “political” in 
the generic sense in which it might be used to describe an impeach­
ment proceeding. Because of the political nature of the dispute, 
only Congress could legitimately determine the continued validity 
of the proposed amendments. Since the child labor amendment was 
itself designed to overturn a constitutional interpretation by the 
Supreme Court,56 a decision by the Court disallowing ultimate politi­
cal definition of the Constitution through the amendment process 
would undermine not only the credibility of the Court but also the 
legitimacy of judicial constitutional interpretation.57
54. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
55. Id. at 451. In proposing amendments, Congress has often set a time 
limit for their ratification. In Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921), the 
Court intimated that there may be a time limit on ratification of proposed amend­
ments. In Coleman, plaintiffs argued that the Court should set a “reasonable 
time” for the ratification of the proposed amendment.
56. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
57. See Scharpf, supra note 43, at 587-97. Perhaps Bickel was referring to 
such inherently political issues when he articulated as a part of the political 
question the idea that the Court wisely sensed that “inner vulnerability, that 
self-doubt of an institution which is electorally irresponsible and has no earth 
to draw from." A. Bickel, supra note 43, at 184.
Professor Bickel later wrote the following concerning the role of the Court 
in policy decisions:
The judicial process is too principal-prone and principal bound—it 
has to be, there is no other justification or explanation for the role 
it plays. It is also too remote from conditions, and deals, case by 
case, with too narrow a slice of reality. It is not accessible to all the 
varied interests that are in play in any decision of great consequence.
It is, very properly, independent. It is passive. It has difficulty con­
trolling the stages by which it approaches a problem. It rushes 
forward too fast, or it lags; its pace hardly ever seems just right. For 
all these reasons, it is, in a vast, complex, changeable society, a most 
unsuitable instrument for the formation of. policy.
A. B ickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 175 (1970). 
Professor Barron took issue with Bickers conception of the Court's deficiencies 
in the arena of political, decisions.
The difficulty with [Bickers] approach is that it enormously decreases 
the role of the Supreme Court in American life. Bickel is really 
making a radical request: if the great political cases are incapable of 
principled resolution, then the Court ought to decline decision of such 
cases. But it is the great political cases which have made the Su­
preme Court, historically and now, a branch of government.
Barron, The Ambiguity of Judicial Review: A Response to Professor Bickel, 
1970 Duke L. J. 591, 595.
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In Baker v. Carr,56 the Supreme Court summarized the theoretical 
foundations of the political questions doctrine.59 Justice Brennan arti­
culated the concept of separation of powers as the touchstone for the 
determination of political questions:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightiy 
according to the settings in which the questions arise may de­
scribe a political question, although each has one or more ele­
ments which identify it as essentially a function of the separa­
tion of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held 
to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding with­
out an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non­
judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect 
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need 
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already 
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro­
nouncements by various departments on one question.60
That Brennan used the term “several formulations” and noted that 
only a slight variation might exist between his various descriptions 
of political question indicates that he recognized the substantial 
redundancy that existed among his criteria. All are connected to 
separation of powers. The first criterion, a “textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment” represents the clearest statement of a 
classical or Wechslerian position. The political question doctrine is 
linked to a textual constitutional delegation to a political branch. 
This articulation avoids erosion of the legitimacy of judicial review 
which could result from recognizing discretion in political questions 
and hence in judicial review itself. The second, “judicially discoverable 
or manageable standards,” is ambiguous enough to be interpreted 
either as simply the constitutionally mandated elements of “cases” 
and “controversies ” concreteness and justiciability, or as including 
discretionary criteria related thereto but not necessarily demanded 
by the Constituiton. The third, involving issues the resolution of 
which demands discretionary policy determinations by the political
58. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
59. See Wechsler, supra note 41. Justice Brennan, in Baker, wrote that 
“[t]he nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the 
separation of powers.” 369 U.S. at 210. He went on to state:
Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by 
the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the 
action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, 
is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a 
responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.
Id. at 211. See also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 517 (1969).
60. 369 U.S. at 217.
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branches, simply combines the first two criteria— i.e., the Court may 
find not only a broad textual grant to the political branches to for­
mulate policy, but also a lack of specific limitations on the means of 
implementing that policy. The next formulation, the impossibility 
of independent judicial resolution without “expressing lack of respect” 
for the political branches, sounds much more discretionary or “pruden­
tial” in nature, but is no less tied to consequences stemming from the 
separation of powers. The same can be said for the final two formu­
lations relating to adherence to an existing political decision and the 
necessity of the national government speaking with one voice under 
certain circumstances: prudential judgment may be inferred, and 
differing functional competence may be recognized, but the basis 
for the doctrine remains a division of responsibility, with powers 
to some degree separated and in check.61
Political Questions and F oreign Policy
Most issues of government policy generally, and foreign policy 
especially, do not present questions “arising under” the Constitution, 
federal law, or treaties. Few policy issues of government are pre­
sented in such a manner that the “cases” and “controversies” require­
ment of adverse parties possessing standing to present justiciable 
issues before a court are met. Most issues therefore must be resolved 
by agencies of government other than the judiciary. But it is also 
clear from the Constitution and from case law that “foreign policy” 
as a subject matter area is not entirely removed from judicial scrutiny. 
The Constitution specifically prescribes a judicial role in foreign 
affairs.62
61. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973 ), provides a recent example of the 
doctrine. Students at Kent State University brought suit seeking injunctive and 
declaratory relief against the Governor and the Ohio National Guard. The 
students argued that the Guard had violated their rights through the use of 
force to suppress campus demonstrations. The court of appeals ordered the 
district court to investigate the training, weaponry, and orders of the Guard. 
The Court held this order to be improper, stating that it was a clear example 
of the type of governmental action that was intended by the Constitution to 
be left to the political branches directly responsible— as die Judicial Branch is 
not— to the electoral process. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of an area 
of governmental activity in which the courts have less competence. The complex, 
subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, 
and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments, 
subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches. 
The ultimate responsibility for these decisions is appropriately vested in branches 
of the government which are periodically subject to electoral accountability. Id. 
at 10.
62. U.S. C o n st , art. Ill $ 2.
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under their Authority;— to all Cases affecting Ambas­
sadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;— . . . to Controversies . . . be­
tween a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign states, Citizens or Subjects.
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In Baker v. Carr, Justice Brennan discussed the role of the 
judiciary in foreign relations. After noting prior judicial statements to 
the effect that all questions involving foreign relations are political 
questions, he went on to demonstrate that the Court will often inde­
pendently decide many such cases. Nevertheless, he acknowledged 
that the major responsibilities in the foreign relations area were given 
to the political branches and pointed to several factors that would 
lead the Court to defer to those branches:
Our cases in this field seem invariably to show a discriminating 
analysis of the particular question posed, in terms of the history 
of its management by the political branches, of its suspectibility 
to judicial handling in the light of its nature and posture in the 
specific case, and of the possible consequences of judicial action.63
Although the judiciary has a role to play in foreign policy, the 
political question doctrine limits that role. This limitation is appro­
priate in light of the preponderant commitment of these issues by 
the Constitution to the political branches, particularly to Congress. 
The nature of modem government and technology have created a 
larger role for the executive than the founders anticipated, but 
the constitutional text should remain the starting point for analysis 
of the division of powers among the branches.
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution empowers Congress to 
provide for the common defense and to create and regulate both land 
and naval forces. Congress also has authority to regulate foreign 
commerce, to define and punish piracy and other crimes on the high 
seas, and to provide for the summoning of the militia to repel insurrec­
tion or invasion. Most importantly, Congress has the power to make 
rules concerning captures, to grant letters of marque and reprisal, and 
to declare war. This broad scope of congressional power is reinforced 
by the necessary and proper clause.
By contrast, the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the 
armed forces and can receive ambassadors and other ministers.64 In 
sum, he has the executive power.05 Other powers, however, are 
granted jointly to the President and the Senate. For instance, the 
President, can negotiate treaties and appoint ambassadors, public 
ministers, and consuls with the advice and consent of the Senate.66
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, 
and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have 
original Jurisdiction. In all other Cases before mentioned, the supreme 
Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such 
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
63. 369 U.S. at 211-13.
64. U.S. Const, art. II § 2.
65. Id., § 1.
66. Id.y § 2.
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These constitutional grants of power suggest several points of 
analysis. First, the political branches have great discretionary powers 
over the conduct of foreign policy. As Chief Justice Marshall noted 
long ago, matters in their nature discretionary are for the political 
branches to decide.67 Second, it was expected by the framers that 
there would be cooperation between the political branches in the 
conduct of foreign policy. The treaty power, viewed (inaccurately 
as it turned out) by the framers as the major means by which our 
foreign relations were to be conducted,68 rests with the Senate and the 
President. Third, certain specified functions are granted to one 
political branch to the exclusion of the other. Congress, for example, 
has the exclusive power to declare war. Although the President may 
respond to insurrection or invasion, the Congress alone may declare 
the existence of war. Such powers cannot constitutionally be dele­
gated by one branch to another.69 Fourth, while violations of separa­
tion of powers in the conduct of foreign affairs have not usually led 
to independent judicial review, absent open disagreement between die 
political branches, alleged violations of individual rights have en­
gendered such review.70 Fifth, the courts will usually refrain from 
reviewing the exercise of discretion in the conduct of foreign relations 
by the political branches. This deference is particularly evident when 
the political departments act in cooperative effort Perhaps less 
defensible is the courts' upholding of political branch’s exercise of 
powers properly belonging to another branch by finding a ratification 
of the action by the branch whose power was usurped.71 The courts 
do provide constitutional, though not fully independent, review on 
the merits, but generally find the executive or legislative act in question 
safely within the limits of legitimate discretionary power.72
67. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
68. L. Henkin, Foreign A ffairs and th e  Constitution 129 (1972).
69. See note 4 supra. The argument that Congress may not constitutionally 
delegate its war-making powers is not conclusive on the issue of war powers ana 
political questions. Arguably the Senate may not “constitutionally' complete 
the impeachment process by convicting a President for something less than nigh 
crimes and misdemeanors, * yet the impeachment provision is one often cited 
as an example of a question textually committed to that branch. The Court 
should refuse to review an impeachment conviction. See Firmage & Mangrum, 
supra note 51, at 1078-85.
70. See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960 ); 
Reid v. Covert, 359 U.S. 1 (1957).
71. See text accompanying notes 80-82 infra.
72. In Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 167-70 (1948), Justice Frankfurter 
upheld and found applicable the Alien Enemy Act of 1798 against an attack 
by a German alien threatened with deportation after the actual fighting had 
ceased.
It is not for us to question a belief by the President that enemy aliens 
who were justifiably deemed fit subjects for internment during active 
hostilities do not lose their potency for mischief during the period of 
confusion and conflict which is characteristic of a state of war even
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When the branch whose rights have been infringed has taken 
action to indicate a disavowal of the act in question, however, the 
case law suggests that the courts can undertake independent constitu­
tional review of alleged violations of separation of power in foreign 
relations.73 The War Powers Resolution of November 7, 1973,74 is 
a contemporary example of an act by which one political branch 
asserts constitutional power against the other. Congress' assertion of 
power should provide both a basis for judicial review of certain 
executive acts and an example of what may be done in other areas 
of foreign policy. Once the judiciary is assured that it is not inter­
meddling in an area of vast discretionary powers granted the political 
branches, it can perform its traditional role as ultimate arbiter over 
the jurisdictional lines delineating the coordinate branches of govern­
ment.
Political Questions and the War Powers
If foreign affairs constitute the core of political question cases, 
the war powers, as the most sensitive and critical manifestation of the 
exercise of foreign relations, are the nub of the core. Yet even here 
the courts have played a significant if limited role and, after the War 
Powers Resolution, they should perform still more actively.
The Constitution delegates the preponderance of the war powers 
to the Congress. The Executive is left ministerial war power preroga­
tives which he may exercise within parameters determined largely by 
Congress.75 The Congressional power to "declare war” carries with 
it, but for one qualification, the exclusive power to initiate war, 
whether declared or undeclared.76 The sole qualification upon Con­
when the guns are silent but the peace of Peace has not come. These 
are matters of political judgment for which judges have neither 
technical competence nor official responsibility.
73. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). When 
the President reported the seizure to Congress, that body took no action on the 
matter; however, “[w]hen the Taft-Hartley Act was under consideration in 1947, 
Congress rejected an amendment which would have authorized such govern­
mental seizures in cases of emergency.” Id. at 586. See Justice Frankfurter’s 
concurring opinion, id. at 597-614.
74. U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. IV, 1974). See generally Note, 1973 War Powers 
Legislation: Congress Re-Asserts Its Warmaking Power, 5 Loy. Chi. L.J. 83
(1974).
75. See, e.g., Berger, War-Making bu the President, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
29 (1972); Firmage, Law and the lndo-China War: A Retrospective View, 
1974 Utah L. Rev. 1; Van Alstyne, Congress, The President, and the Power to 
Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1972); Wormuth, 
The Nixon Theory of the War Power: A Critique, 60 C alif. L. Rev. 623 (1972).
76. The Congress possesses all war-making powers of the United States. 
Those powers not specifically falling within the “declare war” provision most 
assuredly were residual in the "grant letters of marque and reprisal” clause. 
U.S. Const, art I, § 8, cl. 11. See Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: 
The Original Understanding, 81 Yale L.J. 672, 696 (1972).
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gress’ exclusive power to initiate war is the presidential prerogative 
to use military force to repel sudden attack upon the United States77 
and, after the War Powers Resolution, upon its forces.78 In addition 
to its power to “declare war,” Congress’ power extends to the circum­
stances constituting termination of war.79
Even though Congress is in the preeminent position to initiate war, 
it should also be recognized that there are substantial areas related 
to the initiation, conduct and termination of war granted jointly to 
the political branches. Moreover, there are substantial areas where 
responsibilities overlap and their interrelationship is ambiguous. Joint 
and overlapping responsibility impinging upon the decision to go to 
war can arise because of shared responsibility, such as the responsi­
bility for treaties, including peace treaties, shared by the Executive and 
the Senate. An ambiguous interrelationship of the political branches 
can also arise because of executive control of critical functions such 
as negotiation with foreign governments; deployment of military forces; 
and dispersal of information relating to foreign relations and bearing 
upon the decision for war or peace. Further, the bounds of proper 
legislative delegation remains a question of ambiguity and debate. The 
political branches have jousted with each other from the first decades
Thomas Jefferson, as Secretary of State, analyzed the “undeclared war" 
element of reprisal:
[A] reprisal on a nation is a very serious thing . . . .  [W]hen reprisal 
follows, it is considered an act of war, and never failed to produce 
it in the case of a nation able to make war; besides, if the case were 
important and ripe for that step, Congress must be called upon to 
take it; the right of reprisal being expressly lodged with them by the 
Constitution, and not with the Executive.
Quoted in 7 International Law Digest § 1095, at 123 (J. Moore ed. 1906).
Statements from the Constitutional Convention and early cases decided by 
the Supreme Court leave little doubt about the power of Congress over both 
“declared” and “undeclared” war. See Fulbright, Congress, the President and 
the War Power, 25 Ark. L. Rev. 71, 74 (1971). The word “war” was not 
confined to mean only general ( “declared” ) war. Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court found that the President must abide by the limitations set by Congress. 
Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 1 (1801); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dali.) 36 (1800).
77. The records of the constitutional convention show that it was the intent 
of the Framers to provide an exception to the congressional war powers 
enabling the President to repel sudden attacks upon the United States. “Mr. 
Madison and Mr. Gerry moved to insert 'declare/ striking out ‘make* war; 
leaving to the Executive the power to repeal sudden attacks.” Van Alstyne, 
supra note 75, at 6, quoting 2 Records o f the Federal Convention o f 
1789, at 318-19 (M. Farrand ed. 1911).
78. The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief 
to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situa­
tions where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by 
the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to . . . (3 ) a national 
emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or 
possessions, or its armed forces.
50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (1973).
79. Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948).
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of our experience under the Constitution over these issues. One sus­
pects that at least part of this ambiguity was foreseen and planned 
by the framers as an informal level of check, balance, and accommo­
dation by which the political branches were to make certain decisions 
in tandem or not at all. To recognize that presidents may have on 
occasion overstepped constitutional bounds in this process, however, 
is not to say that such precedents necessarily legitimate such acts. The 
secrecy with which some executive acts have been accomplished in­
dicates that even the actors recognized the disparity between their 
acts and their legal obligations.
The judiciary has refused to scrutinize executive and congres­
sional acts in the areas of foreign policy and the war powers in a host 
of factual situations.80 The Court usually notes the discretionary lati­
tude given the political branches and then looks toward an executive 
or congressional act or statement to provide the rule of decision for 
the case. In most cases Congress and the Executive have been in 
accord on the act in question.81 As indicated earlier, when the political 
branches are in disagreement, the Court has been more inclined to 
exercise independent judgment.82
80. Act of Feb. 28, 1975, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424, § 1.
81. The Japanese-American war relocation cases demonstrate most pointedly 
and painfully the expansive limits of the joint, cooperative use of the war powers 
by the political branches. In Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), 
an American citizen of Japanese ancestry was convicted on both counts of a 
two count indictment, with sentences to run concurrently. The first count 
charged a failure to report to the Civil Control Station within the designated 
area, “it appearing that appellant’s required presence there was a preliminary 
step to exclusion from the area of persons of Japanese ancestry.” Id. at 84. 
A review of the first count could well have necessitated a complete constitu­
tional appraisal of the evacuation program. The Court avoided this inquiry 
by stating that “[s]ince the sentences . . . run concurrently, it will be un­
necessary to consider questions raised with respect to the first count if we find 
that the conviction on the second count . . . must be sustained.” Id. at 85. 
The second count, a curfew violation, was affirmed. The curfew was upheld 
as being within the joint power of the Congress and the President. This being 
so, the Court was able to speak of “the war powers of the United States, 
rather than of the independent presidential war power.
One year following Hirabayashi, the Court decided Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944), in which the Court was compelled to decide 
upon the constitutionality of the evacuation program. In upholding its con­
stitutionality, the Court stated that it could not “reject as unfounded the 
judgment of the military authorities and of Congress” that the exclusion was 
necessitated by urgent needs of national defense. The Court deferred to the 
combined discretionary judgment of the political departments. Thus, during a 
time of war, even a classification based on race withstood constitutional attack 
since both political branches acted in cooperative effort under the “war powers 
of the United States.”
82. With reference to Executive action inconsistent with congressional 
authority, the remarks of Justice Jackson, concurring in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952), are instructive:
When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can
rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
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The early case of Martin v, Mott83 provides an example of the 
Courts approach to the discretionary exercise of the war power by 
the Executive. In Martin, the New York militia was summoned by 
the governor pursuant to orders of the President in the prosecution 
of the War of 1812. Jacob Mott refused to report for duty and was 
convicted and fined by court martial. A 1795 Act of Congress 84 
authorized the President to call up the militia "whenever the United 
States shall be invaded, or be in imminent danger of invasion from 
any foreign nation or Indian tribe.” 85 Justice Story for the Court 
found that the President was acting within the bounds of the discre­
tion conferred upon him by the Act:
W e are all of the opinion, that the authority to decide whether 
the exigency has arisen, belongs exclusively to the President, and 
that his decision is conclusive upon all other persons. W e think 
that this construction necessarily results from the nature of the 
power itself, and from the manifest object contemplated by the 
Act of Congress.86
Story noted that “[w]henever a statute gives a discretionary power to 
any person, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain 
facts, it is a sound rule of construction, that the statute constitutes 
him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts.” 87 
Chief Justice Taney in Luther v. Borden 88 spoke in similar terms on 
the capacity of the Court to review independently an exercise of 
discretion by the President in calling out die militia.
The issue of judicial review of presidential discretion in the exer­
cise of the war powers was again before the Court in the Prize Cases*9 
Certain ships had been seized pursuant to President Lincolns blockade 
of southern ports. The Court, in a five to four decision, upheld the
powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive 
presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from 
acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so 
conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what 
is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.
See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (Secretary of State powerless to 
deny passports to American citizens who refused to submit affidavit concerning 
membership in Communist Party); Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 
299 U.S. 5 (1936) (executive without power to extradite fugitive criminals in 
absence of authority from treaty or congressional act); Brown v. United States, 
12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814); United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 
655 ( 4th Cir. 1953), aff’d on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
83. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
84. Act of Feb. 28, 1975, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424.
85. Id. § 1.
86. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 30.
87. Id. at 31-32.
88. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
89. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). See generally S. Bernath, Squall 
Across th e  A tlan tic  18-33 (1970).
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seizures. Justice Grier, writing for the majority, discussed the plenary 
power given the political branches, the congressional statutes granting 
power to the President to call out the militia, and the limited capacity 
of the Court to provide independent review over such discretionary 
acts by the political branches.90 The Court held that although Con­
gress could declare war, the President was empowered to respond to 
an act of war by the Confederacy without congressional authoriza­
tion.91 The Court was also willing to choose from among presidential 
or congressional proclamations or actions the date most appropriate 
in the particular case. Thus, the Prize Cases illustrate that although 
the question of the beginning and ending dates of hostilities is politi­
cal, the answer is at least partially judicially determined.
Similar results were reached in other cases concerning the com­
mencement and cessation of hostilities. In United States v. Anderson 02 
the Court dealt with an act of Congress which allowed southerners 
who had remained loyal to the Union to be reimbursed the value of 
their land which had been sold by the advancing Union forces. 
Whether respondent could recover the value of his land was con­
tingent upon the date the war ended. The Court examined the various 
pronouncements of the political branches and selected a date which 
made recovery permissible.93 -
In 1919, litigation was instituted by several distilleries attacking 
the War-Time Prohibition Act,94 which was signed into law by the 
President on November 21, 1918. The Supreme Court, in Hamilton v. 
Kentucky Distilleries Co.,95 upheld the constitutionality of the Act. 
The distilleries had argued, inter alia, that the Act “became void 
before [the] suits were brought by reason of the passing of the war 
emergency.” 08 Both sides presented evidence consisting of presi­
90. 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 670 (emphasis in original).
91. Id. at 668-69.
92. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 56 (1869).
93. Justice Davis for the Court stated:
In a foreign war, a treaty of peace would be the evidence of the time 
when it closed, but in a domestic war, like the late one, some public 
proclamation or legislation would seem to be required to inform those 
whose private rights were affected by it, of the time when it ter­
minated, and we are of the opinion that Congress did not intend that 
the limitation in this act should begin to run until this was done. There 
are various acts of Congress and proclamations of the President bearing 
on the subject, but in the view we take of this case, it is only necessary 
to notice the proclamation of the President, of August 20th, 1866, ana 
the act of Congress of the 2d of March, 1867. . . .  As Congress,- in its 
legislation for the army, has determined that the rebellion closed the 
20th day of August, 1866, there is no reason why its declaration on this 
subject should not be received as settling the question wherever private 
rights are affected by it.
Id. at 70-71.
94. Ch. 212, 40 Stat. 1045 (1918).
95. 251 U.S. 146 (1919).
96. Id. at 154.
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dential documents, congressional acts, and political events which 
tended to prove the continuance or termination of hostilities.97 The 
Court did not refuse to reach the merits, providing constitutional but 
not independent review. The Court weighed the evidence before it 
and concluded that the political branches had acted within the wide 
discretion afforded them in such matters. It is important to point 
out, however, that the Court left open the question whether a case 
dealing with the termination of war could be presented in which it 
would find the political branches to have been outside the bounds of 
their power.98 Further, Kentucky Distilleries indicates that the Court 
might, in a proper case, decide that legislation passed pursuant to the 
war powers had ceased to be effective.90
Although many issues relating to the war powers present political 
questions, the Court has on occasion spoken independently to such 
issues. Perhaps the strongest statements of limitation upon executive 
action under the war powers are found in Ex parte Milligan.100 There 
the Court held that article III, section 2 of the Constitution,101 along 
with the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments, prohibited a military 
commission from trying a civilian charged with disloyal acts committed 
far from a theatre of military operations when civil courts were also 
available. The Court was unanimous in its opinion that without 
Congressional authorization102 the executive lacked the authority to 
try civilians in military courts outside the theatre of military operations.
97. Id. at 159-60.
98. Conceding, then, for the purposes of the present case, that the 
question of the continued validity of the war prohibition act under the 
changed circumstances depends upon whether it appears that there is 
no longer any necessity for the prohibition of the sale of distilled 
spirits for beverage purposes, it remains to be said that on obvious 
grounds every reasonable intendment must be made in favor of its con­
tinuing validity, the prescribed period of limitation not having arrived; 
that to Congress in the exercise of its powers, not least the war power 
upon which the very life of the nation depends, a wide latitude of 
discretion must be accorded; and that it would require a clear case to 
justify a court in declaring that, such an act, passed for such a purpose, 
nad ceased to have force because the power of Congress no longer 
continued.
Id. at 163.
99. Other war powers cases invoking the political question doctrine involved 
issues concerning the length of time necessary to “pacify” a country by military 
occupation, Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 124 (1901); the determination of 
belligerency, The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 63 (1897); the composition of 
courts martial, Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 6 (1921); and the criteria for 
the commissioning of officers, Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1953).
100. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
101. U. S Const, art. Ill, § 2 states in part: “The Trial of all Crimes, except 
in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury. . .
102. The majority, in a five to four decision, also concluded that even Con­
gress could not institute military trials of civilians outside the theatre of the 
military operations. The Court stated:
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Duncan v. Kahanamoku103 also involved military action affecting 
civilians. In Duncan a civilian in Hawaii had been convicted by a 
military tribunal established pursuant to a declaration of martial law. 
The Supreme Court held that the Hawaiian Organic Act which 
authorized the territorial governor to suspend the writ of habeas corpus 
and declare martial law did not allow the armed forces to substitute 
military for judicial trials of civilians not charged with violations of 
the laws of war. The Court avoided a decision on the constitutionality 
of the Organic Act by finding that Congress had not authorized peti­
tioners’ trials by military tribunal. The case demonstrates not only that 
the Court will be more inclined to act in favor of civil liberties and 
against the government after a war is over,104 but also that the Court 
will be more likely to attempt an independent review of the challenged 
acts if it appears that the political branches have not acted in unison.
When the political branches do not act in unison in regard to a 
war powers issue, not only is the Court more likely to act in its role 
as constitutional arbiter in disputes between the coordinate branches, 
it is also more inclined to uphold the Congressional act due to the 
preponderant textual grant of war powers to Congress. The historic 
intrusion of the executive into this area during a time of congressional 
acquiescence is not likely to prevail as a legitimating factor for the 
continuation of such practices in a judicial proceeding when the 
practices are opposed by the potent combination of subsequent con­
gressional action and constitutional text.105 .
But it is said that jurisdiction is complete under the “laws and usages of 
war/’ It can serve no useful purpose to inquire what those laws and 
usages are, whence they originated, where found, and on whom they 
operate; they can never be applied to citizens in states which have up­
held the authority of the government, and where the courts are open 
and their process unobstructed. This court has judicial knowledge that in 
Indiana the Federal authority was always unopposed, and its courts always 
open to hear criminal accusations and redress grievances; and no usage 
of war could sanction a military trial there for any offence whatever of 
a citizen in civil life, in nowise connected with the military service. Con­
gress could grant no such power; and to the honor of our national legisla­
ture be it said, it has never been provoked by the state of the country 
even to attempt its exercise. One of the plainest constitutional provisions 
was, therefore, infringed when Milligan was tried by a court not ordained 
and established by Congress, and not composed of judges appointed 
during good behavior.
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121-22.
103. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
104. Duncan was decided after any threat of attack on Hawaii had ceased. 
See also Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). But see Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
105. The case most often cited to support the position that the executive 
is preeminent in the exercise of the war powers, United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), may more properly be read as supporting 
the argument that the Court usually will grant broad discretion to actions taken 
jointly by the President and Congress. Justice Sutherland’s sweeping dicta re­
garding the origins of national and executive power over foreign relations and
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Illustrative of the Court’s recognition of Congressional predomi­
nance is Youngstown Sheet ir Tube Co. v. Sawyer,106 decided during 
the Korean hostilities. In 1947 Congress rejected ah amendment to 
the Taft-Hardey Act that would have authorized governmental seizure 
of major industries during a national emergency. In 1952 President 
Truman, by executive order,107 seized most of the nations steel mills108 
to avoid a work stoppage after a general strike had been called by 
the United Steelworkers of America. Justice Black, writing for the 
Court, denied any notion of extra-constitutional “executive power.” 
No enlargement of the scope of constitutional power afforded the 
President as Commander-in-Chief or as the nations executive could 
be claimed by virtue of an emergency of undeclared war.109 The 
concurring opinions110 of Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson, Bur­
ton, and Clark identify more clearly than did Justice Black the critical 
connection between congressional action and independent judicial 
review of presidential acts performed, arguably, under the war powers. 
Justice Burton stated:
The controlling fact here is that Congress, within its constitu­
tionally delegated power, has prescribed for the President 
specific procedures, exclusive of seizure, for his use in meeting 
the present type of emergency. Congress has reserved to itself 
the right to determine where and when to authorize the seizure 
of property in meeting such an emergency. Under these cir­
cumstances, the President’s order of April 8 invaded the juris­
diction of Congress. It violated the essence of the principal 
of the separation of governmental powers.111
the absence of constitutional prohibitions against legislative delegation in 
foreign affairs is now generally rejected. See Firmage, supra note 75, at 42; 
Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical 
Reassessment, 83 Yale L. J. 1 (1973); Wormuth, supra note 75, at 694. The 
holding supported by the facts is simply that the President acted lawfully under 
a joint resolution of Congress which authorized him to prohibit the sale of 
“arms and munitions of war” to specified countries then engaged in hostilities 
if he determined that such prohibition would “contribute to the reestablish­
ment of peace between those countries.” 299 U.S. at 312. Such delegation would 
be considered constitutionally unobjectionable today without conjuring up dif­
ferent constitutional standards for the executive in the conduct of foreign 
and domestic policy.
106. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
107. Exec. Order No. 10340, 8 C.F.R. 65 (Supp. 1952).
108. For a list of the mills seized, see 3 C.F.R. 66, 68 (Supp. 1952).
109. 343 U.S. at 587.
110. 343 U.S. at 593, 629, 634, 655, 660.
111. Id. at 660 (concurring opinion). Justice Clark agreed:
I conclude that where Congress has laid down specific procedures to deal 
with the type of crisis confronting the President, he must follow those 
procedures in meeting the crisis; but that in the absence of such action by 
Congress, the President’s independent power to act depends upon the 
gravity of the situation confronting the nation. I cannot sustain the 
seizure in question because here, as in Little t>. Barreme, Congress had pre­
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Ultimately, then, the only potent check upon the abuse of the war 
powers by one political branch is rejection of its acts by the other. 
Without a Congressional check of executive warmaking, the Court 
is not likely to exercise independent constitutional review, nor is it 
likely to be effective if it does.
Political Questions and the Vietnam W ar
Protraction of the Indochina W a r112 led to attempts to place 
legal constraints upon the Executive’s control of the war. Initially, 
Congress was sufficiently enamored of our involvement in Vietnam 
to grant the executive branch carte blanche 113 power to wage war, 
without limitation as to the identity of the enemy, the length of 
hostilities, the nature of the weaponry employed, or the extent of our 
involvement. This Congressional abdication represented an unconsti­
tutional delegation of congressional war powers to the President.114
As the war continued without resolution, popular support di­
minished. Legislative action of increasing intensity was undertaken 
to curtail and finally end our involvement in Indochina. Congress 
repented of its initial approval by repealing the Tonkin Gulf Reso­
lution.115 Following American incursions into Cambodia in 1970,
scribed methods to be followed by the President in meeting the emergency 
at hand.
Id. at 662 (concurring opinion).
112. American involvement in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos are considered 
jointly under the term Indochina War.
113. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution was approved August 10, 1964. Pub. L. 
No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384. It reads in part as follows:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and 
suports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to 
take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces 
of the United States and to prevent further aggression.
Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to 
world peace the maintenance or international peace and security in south­
east Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the 
Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under 
the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, there­
fore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, in­
cluding the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of 
the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in de­
fense of its freedom.
Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine 
that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by inter­
national conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, 
except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the 
Congress.
114. See Firmage, supra note 75, at 41; Wormuth, supra note 75, at 692. 
But see note 69 supra.
115. The repeal was included within an act “To amend the Foreign Military 
Sales Act, and for other purposes.’* Pub. L. No. 91-672, 84 Stat. 2053, 2055 
(1971). The repeal read:
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Congress enacted the Fulbright Proviso116 prohibiting the use of 
funds for military support of Cambodia. This prohibition was at­
tached to every subsequent military appropriations act.117 The 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1971118 contained a congressional pro­
hibition against construing any American assistance to Cambodia 
as an American commitment to Cambodian defense. After the 
Eagleton Amendment,119 which prohibited the use of any funds for 
military operations in Cambodia, was vetoed, an amendment to the 
Continuing Appropriations Resolution was passed and signed which 
forbade any “funds herein or heretofore appropriated” from being 
used to support combat activities by American forces in North or 
South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia “notwithstanding any other pro­
vision of law.” 120 Finally, and most importantly, Congress through 
joint resolution passed, over presidential veto, the War Powers Reso­
lution of 1973.121
Dialogue in the courts concerning the legality of our participa­
tion in the Indochina War evolved from an initial refusal under £ny 
circumstances to speak to the substance of the question to an in­
creasingly fertile exchange on the nature of standing, political ques­
tion, justiciability, and substantive issues of constitutional delegation 
of the war powers.122 Many* cases attempting to adjudicate the le­
Sec. 12. The joint resolution entitled "Joint resolution to promote the 
maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia" . . . 
is terminated effective upon the day that the second session of the Ninety- 
first Congress is last adjourned.
116. Appropriations Authorization— Military Procurement Act, 1971, Pub. L. 
No. 91-441, $ 502, 84 Stat. 910 (1970).
117. See, e.g., Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1972, Pub. L. No. 
92-204, § 738, 85 Stat. 716 (1971); Appropriations Authorization— Military 
Procurement Act, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-156, § 501, 85 Stat. 423 (1971).
118. Pub. L. No. 92-226, $ 514, 86 Stat. 20 (1972).
119. Eagleton amendment, H.R. Rep. No. 7447, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1973).
120. Resolution For Continuing Appropriations, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-52, 
§ 108, 87 Stat. 130, 134 (1973).
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after August 15, 1973, 
no funds herein or heretofore appropriated may be obligated or expended 
to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by United States military 
forces in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam,
Laos or Cambodia.
121. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541 to 1543 (Supp. Ill, 1973). See generally Emerson, 
The War Powers Resolution Tested the President’s Independent Defense 
Power, 51 Notre Dame Law. 187 (1975); Glennon, Strengthening the War 
Powers Resolutions: The Case for Purse Strings Restrictions, 60 Minn L. Rev. 1
(1975); Note, 1973 War Powers Legislation: Congress Re-Asserts Its War- 
making Power, 5 Loy. Chi. L.J. 83 (1974 ); Note, The Recapture of the SS 
Mayaguez: Failure of the Consultation Clause of the War Powers Resolution, 8 
N.Y.U.J. In t’l .  L. & Pol. 457 (1976).
122. The initial conclusion drawn from the earlier cases brought in the 
federal courts challenging American involvement in Southeast Asia is that the 
judiciary erected an impenetrable wall against all challenges to the legality 
of the War. As time went on, however, the judges fell into disharmony re­
garding various aspects of standing and political question.
H e in O n l in e  - -  49 U. C o lo .  L. Rev. 90 1977-1978
1 9 7 7 ]  W A R  P O W E R S  A N D  P O L I T I C A L  Q U E S T I O N S  9 1
gality of our involvement in Vietnam and Cambodia were dismissed 
for lack of standing to sue.123 Citizens,124 taxpayers,125 congress­
men,126 and military personnel127 were, with a few exceptions,128 
routinely denied standing. Even when the plaintiff was found to 
possess standing, the courts refused to address the merits of the 
case. Some courts disposed of the matter through use of the doc­
trine of sovereign immunity.129 The Supreme Court, however, sub­
A forceful statement, characteristic of early cases, concerning the political 
nature of challenges to the Vietnam War is found in Luftig v. McNamara, 373 
F.2d 664, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (per curiam). In holding that the issue was 
nonjustificable the court stated: ‘[T]hese propositions are so clear that no 
discussion or citation of authority is needed. The only purpose to be accom­
plished by saying this much on the subject is to make it clear to others com­
parably situated and similarly inclined that resort to the courts is futile . . . .”
In 1973 the wall was temporarily pierced—a litigant convinced a federal 
district court judge in New York that circumstances had so changed in 
Southeast Asia that executive-ordered bombing of Cambodia was indeed 
illegal. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. N.Y.), rev’d, 484 
F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert, denied,, 416 U.S. 936 (1974). Judge Orrin G. 
Judd issued an injuction against the continuation of bombing. In the flurry 
of judicial action which followed, the injuction was stayed and finally vacated. 
Schlesinger v. Holtzman, 414 U.S. 1321 (1973).
123. See, e.g,. Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1975); 
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 416 
U.S. 936 (1974); Mottola v. Nixon, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972); Pietsch v. 
President of the United States, 434 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 
403 U.S. 920 (1971); Kalish v. United States, 411 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1969); 
United States v. Battaglia, 410 F.2d 279 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 396 U.S. 
848 (1969); Ashton v. United States, 404 F.2d 95 (8th Cir. 1968), cert, denied, 
394 U.S. 960 (1969); Meyers v. Nixon, 339 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D. N.Y. 1972); 
Velvel v. Johnson, 287 F. Supp. 846 (D. Kan. 1968), aff’d sub nom. Velvel v. 
Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970); 
Campen v. Nixon, 56 F.R.D. 404 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
124. Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1975); Meyers v. 
Nixon, 339 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D. N.Y. 1972).
125. Id,
126. Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455 ( 4th Cir. 1975); Mitchell v. 
Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
127. Not all military personnel were denied standing to sue. Among persons 
denied standing were military reservists, not then called up for active duty, 
and persons eligible for the draft but not in the military. See, e.g., Mas­
sachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971).
128. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Con-
?resspersons had standing to sue); Holtzman v. Richardson, 361 F. Supp. 544
E.D. N.Y.), revd sub nom, Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir.), 
cert, denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1973) (Congresswoman found to have standing 
by trial court); Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971) (military 
personnel serving in Vietnam had standing); Atlee v. Laird, 339 F. Supp. 1347 
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (citizens had standing to challenge expenditures to finance 
the war). "
129. In Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1973); Gravel v. Laird, 
347 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1972); and Velvel v. Johnson, 287 F. Supp. 846 (D. 
Kan. 1968), aff’d  sub nom, Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), 
cert, denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970), the courts accepted the government's 
sovereign immunity argument.
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sequently rejected this defense.130 In those other cases in which 
plaintiffs were found to possess standing, the political question doc­
trine precluded review.131
Most cases attacking the legality of the Vietnam War were dis­
posed of on political question grounds.132 Illustrative of the ap­
proach taken in these cases is Atlee v. Laird,lss a decision by a three- 
judge court in a class action challenging the constitutionality of the 
war. The court was faced with these issues:
(1 )  whether our military participation in Southeast Asia ought 
to be classified as a “war”; (2 )  whether, assuming a formal 
declaration of war is for some reason unnecessary, Congress has 
taken sufficient action to authorize the “war”; and (3 )  whether 
the President, under his w ar powers and regardless of congres­
sional action, has the authority to keep American forces in that 
area.134
In holding that the issues presented nonjusticiable political ques­
tions, the court relied heavily upon Baker v. Carr and Justice Bren­
nan’s formulations of the doctrine, stating that matters of foreign 
relations and war were for the political branches in the exercise of 
their discretionary powers. Review was denied, in part, because 
the courts lacked “judicially manageable standards to apply” in order 
to reach an appropriate conclusion.135 The court found that in such
130. In Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 306 (2d Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 404 
U.S. 869 (1971), the court stated: “[S]overeign immunity is no bar to this 
action, since the complaint alleges that agents of the Government have ex­
ceeded their constitutional authority while purporting to act in the name of 
the sovereign.”
131. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
132. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 ( 2d Cir.), cert, denied, 416 
U.S. 951 (1973); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973); DaCosta 
v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973) (question whether mining of ports 
and harbors of North Vietnam and continuing air strikes were legal was a 
political question); Samoff v. Connally, 457 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1972); Orlando 
v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971); Simmons 
v. United States, 406 F.2d 456 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 395 U.S. 982 (1969); 
United States v. Watson, 373 F. Supp. 1119 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Drinan v. 
Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854 (D. Mass. 1973) (action by members of House of 
Representatives ana Air Force seeking declaration that aerial combat in Cam­
bodia was illegal, held: political question); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 
(E.D. Pa. 1972), *affd, 411 U.S. 911 (1973); Gravel v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 7 
(D.C.C. 1972); Head v. Nixon, 342 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. La.), affd, 468 F.2d 
951 (5th Cir. 1972); Massachusetts v. Laird, 327 F. Supp. 378 (D. Mass.), 
af fd on other grounds, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v. Sisson, 
294 F. Supp. 511 (D. Mass. 1968); Velvel v. Johnson, 287 F. Supp. 846 (D. 
Kan. 1968), cert, denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970).
133. 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (three-judge court), affd, 411 
U.S. 911 (1973).
134. Id. at 703.
135. Id. at 705. But in his dissenting opinion, Chief District Judge Joseph S. 
Lord argued that adequate standards existed for the court to decide the ques­
tions. He contended that Vietnam was clearly at “war” as the term is used in
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cases there was a “demonstrable constitutional commitment” of the 
issues to the political branches.136 The court concluded that federal 
courts were beginning to confront an increasing number of cases 
in sensitive areas of public affairs. In order to avoid entering politi­
cal arenas outside the court’s competence and concern, it was im­
perative that federal courts exercise judicial self-restraint.137
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit developed a dif­
ferent approach to cases challenging the War. In Orlando v. 
Laird 138 servicemen attacked the authority of the Executive to wage 
war in Vietnam. The court stated that
the constitutional delegation of the war-declaring power to 
the Congress contains a discoverable and manageable standard 
imposing on the Congress a duty of mutual participation in 
the prosecution of war. Judicial scrutiny of that duty, there­
fore, is not foreclosed by the political question doctrine. . . .
As we see it, the test is whether there is any action by the 
Congress sufficient to authorize or ratify the military activity 
in question.130
the Constitution. Id. at 711. See also Note, Congress, the President, and the 
Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1771, 1803 (1968); 
Wormuth, supra note 75, at 682. The second issue, whether various acts of 
Congress "provide sufficient congressional authorization under the war making 
clause,” was also clearly justiciable according to Judge Lord. 347 F. Supp. at 
712. Finally, he argued that there were sufficient standards based on historical 
evidence to find that the President had no independent authority to keep Ameri­
can forces in Vietnam. Professor Wormuth, supra note 75, at 680, also re­
sponded to the "standards" issue: There are no standards for going to war, 
and therefore the war power was given to Congress. No suitor may complain 
because Congress has declared war; and the courts may not take an action 
that resembles an act of war, But the standards to determine whether Con­
gress has exercised its war power are simple and easy to apply. Similarly, in 
Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall said that deciding whom to appoint 
was a political question, but whether an appointment had been made was a 
justiciable question. The legality of the Vietnam War is a justiciable question, 
[footnotes omitted]
136. 347 F. Supp. at 705. Despite the use of "constitutional commitment” 
language, the court had earlier described the political question doctrine as "a 
rule born of pragmatic considerations, based on the separation of powers con­
cept and our system of checks and balances.” Id. at 701. Moreover, although 
the Court relied upon the Baker v. Carr formulations of "textual commitment” 
and “manageable standards,” it seemed especially concerned about the practi­
cal implications of its decision on present American foreign policy interests 
and on future options for the political branches in the foreign policy area. Id. 
at 707. Indeed, the Court seemed to be applying the “normative” approach 
to the political question doctrine, the view that extra legal considerations ought 
to govern here. The Atlee court, as well as others facing the question, may 
well have been moved by the “sheer momentousness” of the question, the 
feeling that it is simply beyond the competence of the courts to declare illegal 
a massive military effort of the United States Government.
137. 347 F. Supp. at 708-09.
138. 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
139. Id. at 1042.
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This approach has become known as the ratification theory. The 
importance of the theory was that although it retained the political 
question methodology, it utilized it at a different analytical stage 
of the case than those decisions declaring the entire issue nonjustid- 
able. Rather than mandating outright dismissal of the action as a 
political question, the theory permitted the court to reach the merits 
and determine whether there had been some mutual participation 
between the Congress and the President.140 If the court found par­
ticipation amounting to a ratification of the acts of the Executive, 
the acts subject to attack were upheld. The political question in­
volved was the form of the ‘ mutual participation.” Conceivably, if 
a plaintiff could prove that there had been no mutual participation, 
he could prevail on the merits and avoid the political question doc­
trine altogether. In Orlando, however, the court found satisfactory 
evidence of “mutual participation” amounting to ratification.141
In the early 1970’s, a number of judicial opinions agreed that 
presidential initiation of the use of military force, other than in 
response to attack or insurrection, required the approval of the 
Congress.142 In addition, courts increasingly held that the existence 
of congressional approval of executive use of military forces was a 
justiciable question. The courts were not precluded from addressing 
the issue by the doctrine of political questions. The war was not 
declared unconstitutional, however. Rather, these courts found 
that Congress had given its approval to American participation in 
the Indochina war from the beginning, as manifested by the SEATO 
Treaty, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, military appropriations, ex­
tensions of the draft, and by other supportive legislative acts. The 
accord between the political branches, coupled with the great discre­
tion constitutionally delegated to Congress in regard to its expres­
sion of approval of the use of military force, precluded independent 
judicial review of the constitutional adequacy of that choice.143 The
140. Beyond determining that there has been some mutual participation 
between the Congress and the President, which unquestionably exists 
here, with action by the Congress sufficient to authorize or ratify the 
military activity at issue, it is clear that the constitutional propriety 
of the means by which Congress has chosen to ratify and approve 
the protracted military operations in Southeast Asia is a political ques­
tion. The form which congressional authorization should take is one 
of policy, committed to the discretion of the Congress and outside the 
power and competency of the judiciary, because there are no intelli­
gible and objectively manageable standards by which to judge such 
actions.
Id. at 1043 (emphasis in original).
141. Id. at 1043-44. .
142. See, e.g., DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971); Orlando v. 
Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971); Berk v. 
Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. N.Y. 1970).
143. This approach, of course, has not been without its opponents. Pro­
fessor Wormuth attacked a similar approach employed by Judge Wyzanski in
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dominant theme of these cases was that Congress had supported and 
ratified executive war in Indochina.
The cases challenging the war thus fell into two groups. In 
the majority of the decisions the issue of the legality of Americas 
involvement in Indochina was declared to be a political question. 
The court did not reach the merits but dismissed for lack of a jus­
ticiable controversy. In a smaller number of cases, the courts moved 
their political question formulation to a different stage of the anal­
ysis. They held that although “Congress [had] a duty of mutual par­
ticipation in the prosecution of war,” 144 the form that such partici­
pation had to take was a political question.
In both groups of cases, it was apparent that the courts had 
found that the executive and legislative branches were acting in 
cooperative effort. Had that mutually supportive cooperation been 
lacking, the courts might have decided differently.145 Implicit within 
the reasoning of the above cases is the possibility that without ac­
cord between the political branches—if Congress were to oppose 
executive action in the use of the war powers—independent judicial 
review would be warranted.
Mitchell v. Laird,146 decided in 1973, represented a judicial step 
toward reinterpreting the legitimating basis of congressional ap­
proval of executive direction of American armed forces into hostili­
ties. Judges Wyzansld and Bazelon were willing to restrict the 
confines of the political question doctrine further than any prior 
decisions. The opinion reaffirmed the principal that Congressional
United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511 (D . Mass. 1968). Judge Wyzanski 
asserted that “cooperative action” by the political branches in foreign policy 
“is the very essence of what is meant by a political question/’ la. at 515. 
According to Wormuth: “Thus, the unconstitutionality of the action becomes 
the reason for not inquiring into its constitutionality.” Wormuth, supra note
75, at 686. This deference to the political branches, however, is rooted in a 
judicial concern that Congress and the President not be unduly restricted in 
their joint responses to international crisis and a judgment that a too narrowly 
fashioned rule might create dangerous inflexibility in American foreign policy. 
See, e.g., 294 F. Supp. at 515. These kinds of policy concerns about the con­
sequences of judicial rulings will, like others, probably disappear if the courts 
confront a direct clash between Congress and the President.
144. Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d at 1042.
145. In the words of Judge Coffin:
[I]n a situation of prolonged but undeclared hostilities, where the 
executive continues to act not only in the absence of any conflicting 
Congressional claim of authority but with steady Congressional sup­
port, the Constitution has not been breached. The war in Vietnam 
is a product of the jointly supportive actions of the two branches to 
whom the congeries of the war powers have been committed. Be­
cause the branches are not in opposition, there is no necessity of de­
termining boundaries. Should either branch be opposed to the con­
tinuance of hostilities, however, and present the issue in clear terms, 
a court might well take a different view.
Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971).
146. 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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consent could be manifested other than by formal declaration of 
war and reiterated the view that it was a discretionary matter for 
Congress to determine the form of that manifestation.147 The court 
then broke new ground in the application of the ratification theory. 
First, although Congress had discretion to choose from among sev­
eral means of expressing approval of the use of military forces in 
war, whether it had in fact indicated such approval in the various 
legislative acts was a justiciable rather than a political question. Sec­
ond, whereas most authority held that the appropriation, draft extension, 
and cognate laws constituted Congressional assent,148 Judges Wy- 
zanski and Bazelon rejected that precedent as unsound.
This court cannot be unmindful of what every schoolboy knows: 
that in voting to appropriate money or to draft men a Congress­
man is not necessarily approving of the continuation of a war 
no matter how specifically the appropriation or draft act refers 
to that war. A Congressman wholly opposed to the wars com­
mencement and continuation might vote for the military appro­
priations and for the draft measures because he was unwilling to 
abandon without support men already fighting. An honorable, 
decent, compassionate act of aiding those already in peril is no 
proof of consent to the actions that placed and continue them in 
that dangerous posture. We should not construe votes cast in pity 
and piety as though they were votes freely given to express 
consent.149
Thus, the court concluded that Congress had not validly assented to 
the Vietnam War.
The Mitchell case is demonstrative of the rift that came to sep­
arate members of the federal judiciary on the Indochina issue.150 As
147. Id. at 015.
148. Id.
149. Id. Nevertheless, the court in Mitchell found a political question that 
precluded a decision on the merits, based on the discretion that a president 
must have in ending a war. In Note, War in Cambodia—Political Question?, 
38 Alb. L. Rev. 245, 261 (1974), it is contended that
the finding of a political question in Mitchell was based on the prac­
tical considerations of expediency which characterize the prudential 
considerations outlined by Bickel. The Court was saying that despite 
the fact that under the Constitution Congress must authorize these 
military activities, and despite the fact that Congress had not done 
so, the Court would not determine the issue. The Court avoided a 
decision because considerations of expediency would make a principled 
decision imprudent in light of the practical political environment in 
which the issue was enmeshed and in light of the Court’s ignorance 
as to the immediate ramifications of such a decision.
Mitchell might also be described as an application of BickeFs suggestion that 
the courts should praise principle even if they must bow to considerations of 
expediency. See note 43 supra. The two judges must have felt it important, 
if only for another day, that it be established that congressional ratification of 
executive war should involve more than mere acquiescence.
150. The rift between judges over the sensitive issue of Indochina is appar­
ent from the statements of Judge MacKinnon in his argument in favor of
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the conflict tore at the domestic tranquility, so it was reflected in 
disagreement on the bench.
By the time the War closed, a district court judge in Holzman 
v. Schlesinger151 had gone so far as to issue an injunction against 
continued bombing in Cambodia. Congressional opposition to mil­
itary activity in Cambodia was predominant. After the failure to 
override the Presidents veto of the Eagleton Amendment, a com­
promise measure was passed which prohibited the use of appropri­
ated funds in Cambodia after August 15, 1973. In Holtzman the 
district court used the ratification theory analysis and concluded 
that the President had not been authorized by Congress to bomb 
in Cambodia and therefore was acting beyond his legal authority. 
In a real sense, the bombing of Cambodia was as much out of 
harmony with a majority in Congress—against the “implied will” 
of Congress, to use Justice Jackson’s phrase—as was President 
Trumans seizure of the steel mills.152 The district court reasoned 
that not only had Congress expressed opposition to the bombing, 
but also that the “forced” compromise amendment could hardly 
represent an authorization of continued bombing until August 15, 
1973. Nevertheless the circuit court of appeals reversed.153 Holtz­
man,, then, raises perhaps the most serious challenge to the thesis 
that the courts will independently review war powers acts of the 
Executive when those acts are out of harmony with congressional will.
Several factors must be considered, however, to understand the 
reversal by the circuit court. First, the Cambodia bombing rep­
resented final stages in a protracted conflict which the courts had
granting a rehearing en banc to review the panel decision in Mitchell. 488
F.2d at 618. He disagreed vehemently with Judges Wyzanski and Bazelon on 
the issue of congressional assent to the war.
The primary error in the panel opinion is that it confuses the expressed 
intent of Congress with what is completely court-created speculation 
as to motive. Intent and motive are not the same. Even if courts 
possessed authority and jurisdiction to inquire into the motives of 
Congress, which they do not, the panel opinion only asserts a possi­
ble speculative motive, i.e., what “A Congressman [not even a majority 
of either House of Congress] . . . might vote/' (Emphasis added.) This 
irrational and illusory base has no support in the record and is not 
proper support for a responsible judicial decision. I would thus ex­
cise the heretofore quoted portion of the opinion . . . .  In view of the 
now complete removal of United States ground forces, the quoted 
language of the opinion is nothing more than a court-created post 
hoc rationalization, devoid of any support in the record, which is ob­
viously so untimely, illogical and political that it should not form any 
part of a judicial opinion.
Id.
151. 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y.), revd, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir.), cert, 
denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1973). See note 122 supra.
152. See text accompanying notes 106-11 supra.
153. 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973).
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systematically refused to find unconstitutional. The appellate court 
undoubtedly recognized the practical distinction between the relative 
ease of initiating war as opposed to the difficulty of ending it. The 
circuit court in Holtzman was convinced that the judiciary was 
incompetent to draw the line between tactical decisions which the 
President might make as Commander-in-Chief without congressional 
approval and those for which he needs new congressional authoriza­
tion. The circuit court was also unwilling to go behind the face of 
the compromise amendment and find that Congress did not intend 
to authorize a temporary continuation of the bombing. The court 
was hesitant to interpose itself in accommodations being worked out 
between the branches. This hesitancy may suggest that the more sen­
sitive the area of the war power involved, the more direct must be 
the clash between the branches to bring about judicial intervention. 
As helpful a precedent as the Youngstown case may be, it should be 
remembered that the Court’s position was strengthened because it 
was a labor case as well as a war powers case. Finally, there were 
extra-legal factors in Holtzman which probably motivated the Court 
of Appeals, particularly, an affidavit by Secretary of State Rogers to 
the effect that a holding against the administration would do 
“irreparable harm” to the conduct of American foreign relations. 
Such considerations undoubtedly would have been less persuasive 
if congressional opposition had been clear, formal and unequivocal.
The W ar Powers Resolution 154
The War Powers Resolution is a strong congressional restate­
ment of the constitutional moorings of the war powers.155 Presi­
dential power to introduce American forces into hostilities, according 
to the Resolution, exists only in response to attack or upon authoriza­
tion by congressional statute or declaration of war.156 Consultation 
with Congress is required “in every possible instance” before intro­
ducing American forces into hostilities or situations where imminent 
involvement in hostilities is likely.157 The President must report to 
Congress the “circumstances necessitating the introduction” and the 
“constitutional and legislative authority” for the introduction.158
154. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1973).
155. Id. § 1541(a), states:
It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the 
framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the 
collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply 
to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or 
into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly in­
dicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces 
in hostilities or in such situations.
156. Id. § 1541(c).
157. Id. § 1542.
158. Id. § 1543(a)(3).
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Within sixty days of the submission of a report, the President must 
terminate the use of American armed forces, unless Congress “has 
declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such 
use . . . , ” or extended the sixty day period. An exception is pro­
vided if Congress is unable to meet because of armed attack upon 
the country.159 Notwithstanding the sixty day provision, the Presi­
dent must remove American forces from hostilities outside the 
“United States, its possessions and territories” if there has been no 
declaration of war or statutory authorization for the use of the 
armed forces in hostilities if “Congress so directs by concurrent reso­
lution.” 160
The War Powers Resolution provides a significant definition of 
political questions and the exercise of the war powers for the courts. 
Specifically, congressional authorization for the introduction of Amer­
ican armed forces into “hostilities or into situations wherein involve­
ment in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not 
be inferred from any provision of law . . . including any provision 
contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically 
authorizes” 161 such introduction. Nor shall said inference be drawn 
from “any treaty . . . unless said treaty is implemented by legislation 
specifically authorizing the introduction” of armed forces into hostili­
ties or into situations likely to result in hostilities.162 The War Powers 
Resolution thus brings congressional interpretation of its own acts 
of authorization or ratification of executive actions under the war 
powers very dose to the position taken by Judges Bazelon and 
Wyzanski in Mitchell.
Congress has, through the War Powers Resolution, provided the 
Executive and the courts with an interpretation of part of the war 
powers: a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization is 
necessary before the Commander-in-Chief may introduce United 
States forces into hostilities for any substantial length of time. The 
criteria often cited by the courts as indicating congressional assent 
to executive use of the war powers— appropriation acts and the 
SEATO treaty for instance— do not, by themselves, constitute con­
gressional authorization. The War Powers Resolution’s requirement 
of specificity in congressional authorization disowns any past con­
gressional delegation of its war powers and warns the Executive and 
the courts not to rely upon such techniques in the future.163
159. Id. § 1544(b).
160. Id. § 1544(c).
161. Id. § 1547(a)(1).
162. Id. § 1547(a)(2 ). .
163. The War Powers Resolution should be a sufficiently strong statement 
of congressional will and intent to invoke the precedents for judicial review in 
the area of war powers, especially Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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Conclusion
When the executive and legislative branches are in open dis­
agreement over the employment of the war powers, most of the 
criteria of political question noted in Baker v. Carr point toward 
independent judicial review. The question of the constitutional dele­
gation is simply which of the political branches should prevail. The 
national government is not speaking with one voice and may be 
able to do so only after judicial determination of constitutional 
competence. The embarrassment of ‘multifarious pronouncements” 
has occurred, not by judicial intrusion, but as a result of disputes 
between the political branches.
Both political branches possess weapons that may be used 
against the other if judicial review is not accomplished. The Exec­
utive, acting beyond its constitutional mandate, could exercise power 
over the armed forces, to some degree in defiance of congressional 
will. Congress could hamstring executive spending in the conduct 
of foreign policy and in unrelated areas as well. Congress could use 
its impeachment weapon to reassert its ultimate control over the 
direction of foreign policy and its interpretation of the war powers. 
But the Supreme Court has traditionally spoken on the question of 
constitutional competence in disputes between the coordinate 
branches,164 as it has between the national government and the 
states.165 Judicial review, though appropriate perhaps in a narrower 
range of cases involving the coordinate branches of government than 
in the more obviously m andated166 area of disputes between the 
states and the federal government, is nevertheless a more appropriate 
means of establishing constitutional competence than is guerrilla war­
fare between the political branches. Although the Court has tradi­
tionally been more sensitive to violations of individual rights167 
than to violations of separation of powers, recent cases not related
164. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Train v. City of New 
York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Kendall v. 
United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 527 (1838); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
165. U.S. Const, art. VI. “I do not think the United States would come to 
an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think 
the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the 
laws of the several States.” O. W. Holmes, Law and the Court, in Collected 
Legal Papers 291, 295-96 (1920).
166. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Cooper v. 
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 
(1816); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); Dartmouth College 
v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 W heat) 518 (1819); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
167. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid 
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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to the war powers do indicate an increased sensitivity by the Court 
to the latter concept.168
Ultimately, the real check upon executive abuse of the war 
powers, as for most other executive misuse of power, must come 
from congressional action. When Congress expresses its view of the 
war powers as it did in the War Powers Resolution, in opposition 
to presidential acts, the judiciary is substantially free from the limita­
tions of the doctrine of political questions. Accordingly, the judiciary 
could then perform its function of independent review of the consti­
tutional delegation to the political branches.
168. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); National League of Cities v. 
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975); 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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